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LAWYER ADVERTISING: 

THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF BATES 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 1974, John Bates and Van O'Steen, two members of 
the Arizona State Bar Association, established a "legal clinic" in 
Phoenix, Arizona. 1 They sought to provide low cost legal services 
to persons of moderate income who did not qualifY for legal assis­
tance and yet could not afford private counsel. 2 The clinic, which 
handled only routine cases, 3 established a "systems approach" to 
handle recurring problems. 4 The attorneys developed procedures 
for particular tasks which could then be followed by paralegal assis­
tants. Standardized forms were used whenever possible. Attorneys 
and staff members specialized to increase their efficiency. These 
techniques, along with a low pront margin, enabled the clinic to 
serve a large number of clients at a lower price then the typical 
private law nrm. 
The clinic required a large number of clients to achieve its 
goal of providing low cost, efficient legal services to the commu­
nity. To attract clients, Bates and O'Steen placed an advertisement 
in the Arizona Republic, a newspaper of general circulation in the 
Phoenix metropolitan area, on February 22, 1976. 5 The advertise­
ment violated Disciplinary Rule 2-10l(B) of the ABA CODE 
1. The appellants had previously worked for the Maricopa Legal Aid Society 
for two years following graduation from Arizona State University College of Law. 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,353 (1977). 
2. The practice was established "as a conscious effort to provide legal services 
of good quality to persons of low and moderate income who did not qualifY for gov­
ernmental legal aid and who consequently had difficulty finding lawyers at prices 
they could afford." Brief for the Appellants at 6, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350 (1977). 
3. "The types of cases which appellants accept are uncontested divorce and 
other domestic relations matters; adoptions; guardianship and conservatorship; ... 
personal injury matters; and some consumer contract and real estate work." ld. at 8. 
4. "While such a systems approach and use of paralegals may be common in 
large firms engaged in commercially-oriented practice, they are quite unusual in 
firms serving the moderate-income clientele of the appellants." ld. at 7. 
5. The clinic experienced an increase in volume following the advertisement, 
but this may in part be attributed to news' stories concerning the advertisement. ld. 
at 10. 
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OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy6 because it listed the cost of le­
gal services. Bates and O'Steen challenged, on first amendment 
grounds, the total ban on advertising imposed by the rule. 
The Arizona State Bar Association initiated disciplinary actions 
against Bates and O'Steen for their violation of the disciplinary 
rule. A three-member Special Administrative Committee, after 
conducting a hearing, recommended to the state Board of Gover­
nors a suspension of not less than six months for both attorneys. 
The Board of Governors, finding a good faith challenge to the rule, 
reduced the punishment to a one-week suspension for each attor­
ney, with the weeks to run consecutively. Bates and O'Steen ap­
pealed the decision of the Board of Governors to the Supreme 
Court of Arizona and sought a modification of the disciplinary rule 
in question. 7 
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the restrictions on 
lawyer advertising imposed by the disciplinary rule did not violate 
the first amendment. 8 In upholding the ban, the court noted that 
"[r]estrictions on professional activity and in particular advertising, 
have repeatedly survived constitutional challenge . . . . The legal 
profession, like the medical profession, has always prohibited ad­
vertising since it is a form of solicitation deemed contrary to the 
best interests of society."9 Although the United States Supreme 
Court had recently held in Virginia State Board of Phannacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Counci[1° that consumers had a first 
amendment right to receive commercial information concerning the 
price of prescription drugs, the Arizona Supreme Court declined 
to apply similar reasoning in In re Bates. 11 The court relied in­
stead on Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in that case, 
which noted that "quite different factors would govern were we 
6. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), 
embodied in ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 29(a), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ~ 29(a) (Supp. 1977). In perti­
nent part, the rule states: "A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner ... as 
a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements ... nor shall he authorize 
or permit others to do so on his behalf." 
7. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 396, 555 P.2d 640, 642 (1976). 
8. Id. at 399, 555 P.2d at 645. A separate challenge based on an alleged violation 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act was rejected by the Supreme Court of Arizona on the 
basis of the state action exception cited in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The 
United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld this part of the opinion. This issue 
is beyond the scope of this note. 
9. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394,397, 555 P.2d 640, 643 (1976) (citations omitted). 
10. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying 
notes 40-48 infra. 
11. 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976). 
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faced with a law regulating or even prohibiting advertising by the 
traditional learned professions of medicine or law. "12 The major­
ity, however, agreed with the Board of Governors that Bates and 
O'Steen had placed the advertisement in the newspaper as a good 
faith challenge to the validity of DR 2-101(B) and changed the sus­
pension to censure. 13 
Justice Holohan, dissenting from the majority opinion, framed 
the nrst amendment issue in terms of "the right of the public as 
consumers and citizens to know about the activities of the legal 
profession. "14 Despite his personal distaste for advertising, he con­
cluded that instead of the total ban on advertising imposed by the 
disciplinary rule, the proper remedy was to ban only deceptive or 
misleading advertising. 15 
In their appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Bates and 
O'Steen argued that the commercial speech contained in their ad­
vertisement should be protected by the nrst amendment against 
the disciplinary rule's advertising ban.16 Relying upon the Supreme 
Court's decision in Virginia State Board of Phannacy, they argued 
that the consumer's interest in the cost and availability of legal 
services outweighed the justmcations for imposing a total ban on 
lawyer advertising. 17 
The Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 18 fol­
lowed Justice Holohan's lead and reversed the decision of the Su­
preme Court of Arizona on nrst amendment grounds. The Court's 
12. Id. at 398, 555 P.2d at 644 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 774). Justice Gordon, in a special concurrence, stated, "Whether a blanket 
ban on certain forms of advertising is unconstitutional as violative of the First 
Amendment is a far weightier question which I am not yet prepared to resolve in the 
negative." [d. at 402, 555 P.2d at 648. 
13. [d. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646. 
14. [d. at 402, 555 P.2d at 648. 
15. This Court should forthrightly declare the rule unconstitutional. We can 
then attempt to write rules which provide for public access to information 
about attorneys .... [W)hat we have now is defective. We need to create 
new guidelines which allow for broader dissemination of information to the 
public but at the same time protect them from misleading or deceptive 
statements. 
[d. at 404,555 P.2d at 6.50 (Holohan, J., dissenting). 
16. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 2, at 23. 
17. The justifications argued in favor of the disciplinary ban are discussed at 
text accompanying notes 70-86 infra. 
18. 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens 
joined the majority opinion of Justice Blackmun on the first amendment issue. As 
previously stated, the entire Court rejected the challenge based on the Sherman Act. 
See notes 8-9 supra. 
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holding, simply stated, was that "advertising by attorneys may not 
be subject to blanket suppression. . . . "19 More specifically, the 
Court stated that the first amendment protects the flow of truthful 
information from suppression by the disciplinary rule applied in the 
instant case. 20 Even though the Court limited its opinion to allow 
lawyer advertising of prices for certain routine services,21 the likely 
result, as noted by Justice Powell in dissent,22 is an expansion 
of advertising by lawyers beyond the confines of the majority 
opinion. 23 
II. BACKGROUND 
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court applied the ves­
tiges of the commercial speech doctrine24 to the traditional ban on 
lawyer advertising. 25 The distinction between commercial speech 
and other varieties of speech under the first amendment was 
created in the landmark case of Valentine v. Chrestensen. 26 In up­
holding a city sanitation regulation banning the distribution of a 
circular advertising a submarine tour, the Supreme Court casually 
remarked that commercial speech was not entitled to first amend­
ment protection. 27 The commercial speech doctrine, as it devel­
19. 433 U.S. at 383. 
20. Justice Blackmun, for the majority, stated: 

The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent 

the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement. ... We 

rule simply that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we 

therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appel­

lants to be violative of the First Amendment. 

Id. at 384. 
21. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text. 
22. "Although the Court's opinion professes to be framed narrowly, and its 
reach is subject to future clarification, the holding is explicit and expansive with 
respect to the advertising of undefined 'routine legal services.''' 433 U.S. at 389 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
23. Seven members of the Court agreed that the fee for an initial consultation 
and hourly rate could be properly advertised. Only five justices agreed to allow price 
advertising for routine, standardized services. 
24. See text accompanying notes 37-45 infra. 
25. See note 6 supra. 
26. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
27. The advertiser attempted to gain first amendment protection by printing, on 
the reverse side of the advertisement, a protest about the wharf facilities. The protest 
was ignored by the Court, which felt, according to one commentator, "that commercial 
advertising was merely ancillary to the proper performance of a business, and accord­
ingly could be regulated by legislative action in the public interest. Thus, without 
citing precedent, historical evidence, or policy considerations, the Court effectively 
read commercial speech out of the first amendment." Redish, The First Amendment 
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oped, held that once speech is determined to be commercial in 
nature, the first amendment offers no protection from governmen­
tal regulation. 28 
The Court's dissatisfaction with the doctrine,29 due largely to 
the inability to define "commercial speech," frequently led it to 
avoid finding pure commercial speech.30 Instead, the Court refused 
to limit speech which arguably presented opinions or ideas of the 
speaker.31 The content of the advertisement became the focus of 
review,32 and only speech dealing with a purely commercial trans­
action was subjected to restrictions that could not be placed on 
other varieties of speech. 
In Bigelow v. Virginia,33 the Court narrowed the scope of the 
doctrine. In that case, an advertisement, printed in a Virginia 
newspaper in violation of a state statute, contained information 
about the availability of legal abortions in New York City and re­
ferred potential patients to a clinic at which abortions and counsel­
ing were available. The Court recognized that when an advertise-
in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 CEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971). 
28. See generally Redish, supra note 27; Rotunda, The Commercial Speech 
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080. 
29. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (the Chres­
tensen decision "was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection.") 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
30. Few cases have specifically relied upon the commercial speech doctrine to 
prohibit commercial speech. For one case which did rely on the doctrine, see Breard 
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door sales of 
magazines did not abridge freedom of speech since the element of selling a subscrip­
tion brought a commercial feature into the transaction not present in the mere dis­
tribution of the materials). See also Note, Commercial Speech and the First Amend­
ment: An Emerging Doctrine, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 660 (1977). 
31. For instance, if the advertisement presented both a commercial and politi­
cal message, a court would examine the primary purpose of the advertisement to 
determine whether constitutional protection was afforded to the speaker. See, e.g., 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (incidental commercial quality of the 
communication combined with a lack of profit motive in the distribution of religious 
books made an ordinance barring door-to-door sales inapplicable). If an advertise­
ment could be construed as communicating information of public interest, the doc­
trine was inapplicable. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). Unlike the advertisement in Valentine, the advertisement was entitled to pro­
tection since "it communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, 
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement 
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and con­
cern." 316 U.S. at 266. 
32. "If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment 
protection ... it must be distinguished by its content." 425 U.S. at 761. 
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
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ment presented a matter of public interest, some first amendment 
protection was afforded to the speech. 34 The Court's task was that 
of "assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and we~ghing it 
against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. "35 
Even though the advertisement in this instance related to the mar­
ketplaceof products and services, the Court held that the adver­
tised message was not valueless in the marketplace of ideas and 
deserved constitutional protection. 36 
The Court further reduced the significance of the doctrine in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. 37 In that case, consumers chal­
lenged a state ban on the advertisement of prescription drugs by 
pharmacists. The Court focused on "the particular consumer's 
interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest 
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's 
most urgent political debate. "38 The Board of Pharmacy argued 
that the ban was necessary to protect consumers from misleading 
advertisement. The Board feared that the consumer might consider 
only the price of the drugs when deciding where to purchase drugs 
and not the professionalism of the druggist. The Court rejected this 
"consumer protection" argument and decided that the paternalistic 
attitude of the state was unnecessarily restrictive. Instead of a 
paternalistic approach, the state was "to assume that this informa­
tion is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own 
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the 
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication 
rather than to close them. "39 
The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy did not bar the 
34. Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of po­
tential interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly 
in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity 
about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter of the law of another State 
and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia. 
[d. at 822. The Court in this decision declined to decide "the extent to which consti­
tutional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and 
in the face of all kinds of regulation." [d. at 826. 
35. [d. 
36. In reference to Bigelow, the United States, in its amicus brief in Bates, 
claimed that "there is no material difference between legal and medical services that 
would make the First Amendment applicable to advertisements concerning abortions 
but not to advertisements concerning uncontested divorces." Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae at 23, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1977). 
38. [d. at 763. 
39. Id. at 770. 
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state from placing restrictions on commercial speech. The Court 
afforded a lower priority to commercial speech than to ideological 
or political speech because of two "commonsense differences" in 
the type of speech presented. 40 First, commercial speech was less 
fragile and unlikely to be hampered or "chilled" by regulations. 41 
The profit motive guarantees that advertisers will continue to pro­
mote their products or services for the benefit of potential consum­
ers despite regulations on the type of message permitted. Second, 
commercial speech is usually easily verifiable by the advertiser. 42 
The state could prohibit false, deceptive, or misleading advertise­
ments and those advertisements concerning unlawful products or 
services. 43 A total ban on advertising, however, inhibited the nor­
mal functioning of the competitive market economy; commercial 
speech, although subject to certain restrictions not imposed on 
other varieties of speech, was not outside the protection of the first 
amendment. 44 
The Court's discussion of commercial speech in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy centered on whether professional advertising 
was protected by the first amendment. The Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy sought to justifY the advertising ban as a measure de­
signed to uphold the standards and dignity of the profession. 45 
These justifications, in the Court's opinion, were insufficient to 
withstand the challenge by information seeking consumers. 46 The 
Court, however, declined to extend the first amendment protection 
afforded to advertising by pharmacists to advertising by lawyers. 47 
40. Id. at 771 n.24. For a further discussion of the "commonsense differences" 
between types of speech, see id. at 777-81 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
4l. Id. at 771 n.24. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional 
Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969). 
42. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
43. Id. at 771-72. 
44. Following Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court ruled in Linmark As­
socs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), that a town ordinance 
could not prohibit property owners from placing "for sale" or "sold" signs on their 
property to stem a perceived "white flight" to neighboring communities. The infor­
mation which the ordinance sought to restrict was "of vital interest to Willingboro 
residents, since it may bear on one of the most important decisions they have a right 
to make: where to live and raise their families." Id. at 96. 
45. 425 U.S. at 768. 
46. Id. at 770. 
47. Although we express no opInIon as to other professions, the distinc­
tions, historical and functional, between professions, may require considera­
tion of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not 
disperse standardized products; they render professional seroices of almost 
infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for 
356 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:349 
The Court noted significant differences between the standardized 
drugs sold by a pharmacist and the professional services rendered 
by lawyers. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, stated, 
"Attorneys and physicians are engaged 'primarily' in providing ser­
vices in which professional judgment is a large component, a mat­
ter very different from the retail 'sale' of labeled drugs already pre­
pared by others. "48 
Although Bates raised the issue of lawyer advertising under 
the first amendment for the first time,49 the consumer's right to 
better access to the legal system had been upheld in contexts other 
than advertising. Several earlier cases held that lawyers employed 
by associations of workers or minorities did not improperly solicit 
clients. 50 The state bar associations generally argued that a lawyer, 
by accepting cases from members of the association, initiated the 
contact with the client in a manner one step removed from in­
person solicitation. 51 In each of these cases, the Court recognized 
that "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to 
the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First 
Amendment. "52 Similarly, advertising, by indicating the cost and 
availability of a lawyer, initiates contact with the client in a manner 
resembling a situation where the lawyer is available to association 
members for a stated fee. Moreover, absent collective activity, the 
logical conclusion is that "[pjotential clients who are so dispersed, 
disorganized and powerless that they cannot organize their own 
litigation programs would seem to be in even greater need of in-
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of adver­
tising. 
ld. at 773 n.25. 
48. ld. at 774 (Burger, C.]., concurring). 
49. The prohibition on advertising by the legal profession was upheld in earlier 
state court. decisions. See Mayer v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal. 2d 71, 39 P.2d 206 
(1934); In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928); State ex rei. Hunter v. 
Crocker, 132 Neb. 214, 271 N.W. 444 (1937). 
50. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (collec­
tive action to protect members from excessive fees charged by incompetent attorneys 
under the FELA); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 
(1967) (collective action to obtain affordable and effective lawyers for personal injury 
suits); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (legal 
aid department established to provide legal counsel to union members); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (counsel employed by the association to litigate civil 
rights claims brought by its members). 
51. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-103(a) 
prohibits in-person solicitation. 
52. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 
(1971). 
1978] LAWYER ADVERTI SI.VG 357 
formation regarding their legal rights . . . . "53 Advertising is one 
method of informing consumers about how to obtain knowledge of 
their legal rights. 
Another example of a court favoring dissemination of informa­
tion about lawyers to consumers is Consumers Union of United 
States v. American Bar Association. 54 In that case, the petitioners 
sent questionnaires to local attorneys to obtain information about 
consultation fees and billing practices for publication in a local con­
sumer directory. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), however, prevented the lawyers from 
answering the questions regarding fees. Furthermore, since the 
factual information was to appear in an unapproved directory in 
violation of DR 2-102(A)(6),55 the questions dealing with name, 
address, and education could not be answered without fear of dis­
ciplinary action. The district court ruled that the overly broad dis­
ciplinary rules could not prevent petitioners from obtaining and 
publishing consumer information. 56 The decision recognized the 
consumers' need for information about the cost and availability of 
legal services. In Consumers Union, the district court applied an 
overbreadth analysis to strike down the disciplinary rules. 57 Over­
breadth analysis requires the court to consider whether the chal­
lenged regulation affects protected speech as well as unprotected 
speech. Since the district court found that the directory sought to 
be published by Consumers Union was neither misleading nor de­
ceptive, it ruled that the ban affected speech protected by the first 
amendment and was, therefore, overbroad. 58 This analysis prevents 
53. Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal 
Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1186 (1972). 
54. 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded for further con­
sideration in light of Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
55. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-102 
(A)(6) prohibits the listing of a lawyer's name in an unapproved legal directory. The 
local bar association refused to approve the Consumers Union directory. 
56. 427 F. Supp. at 523. Two judges disagreed on the extent of price adver­
tising that should be permitted. Judge Merhige would allow fees for legal services 
to be advertised if the particular service is adequately specified, but the record did 
not contain the necessary evidence in this instance. A special concurrence by Judge 
Warriner expressed the view that "the advertiSing of a fee for any legal service 
other than for an initial consultation of a specified length is inherently misleading 
and thus, far from helpful, is harmful." Id. at 527. These opinions foreshadowed the 
dispute between Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell in the Bates decision. See 
note 67 infra and accompanying text. 
57. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 844 (1970). 
58. 427 F. Supp. at 523. 
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an overly broad regulation from hampering or "chilling" protected 
speech. By voiding the disciplinary rule, the court protected the 
rights of other publishers to print the same type of information59 
and forced state bar associations to reconsider the total ban im­
posed by the rule. 60 
III. THE BATES CASE 
In its consideration of Bates, the Supreme Court faced a con­
flict between a growing movement by consumers to obtain informa­
tion regarding the cost and availability of legal services61 and the 
traditional ban on lawyer advertising supported by the commercial 
speech doctrine. The appellants accurately asserted that "[t]he 
public need for such information is immense; tens of millions of 
Americans do not know how to find a lawyer and are afraid they 
cannot afford one."62 Consumer ignorance concerning the availabil­
ity of lawyers' services conflicted with the teaching of Virginia State 
Board of Phannacy that consumers should be informed about mat­
ters vitally important to their daily lives. 63 
59. However, the publisher's claim for constitutional protection "must to a sub­
stantial extent be the kind of expressive and associational behavior which at least has 
a colorable claim to the protection of the amendment." Note, supra note 57, at 860. 
60. A major impetus of the overbreadth doctrine is to require statutory 
focus on the precise harms which are the asserted justification for interfering 
with expressive activity. The degree of specificity makes all the difference 
-both in avoiding overbreadth in the first instance, and then in inducing 
enforcement agents and factfinders to focus carefully on variables which are 
relevant to the question of first amendment privilege as well as the question 
of statutory violation. 
[d. at 921. 
61. Both the appellants and the Court discussed the need for the consumer to 
receive the advertisement to a greater extent than the need for the lawyer to adver­
tise. The Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy concluded that the consumers had 
standing to challenge the restrictions, since "[ilf there is a right to advertise, there is 
a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these Appel­
lees." 425 U.S. at 757 (footnote omitted). 
62. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 2, at 23. Several studies support the 
conclusion reached by the appellants. E.g., Petition of the Board of Governors of the 
District of Columbia Bar of the District of Columbia (1976), reprinted in Brief of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 36, app. B, at 24a (citing affidavit of 
James G. Frierson, Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 
427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1975)). The study reported that middle class consumers 
overestimated lawyers' fees by 91% for the drawing of a simple will, by 340% for 
reading and advising on a two-page installment sales contract, and by 123% for a 30­
minute consultation. See also B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODER­
ATE MEANS (1976); Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 
A.B.A.J. 1092, 1093 (1971) (fear of cost one of the chief reasons that the public does 
not use the services of a lawyer). 
63. 425 U.S. at 770. 
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The representatives of the bar association recognized the need 
to provide consumers with information about their legal rights. 64 
They justified the ban on price advertising, however, on six 
grounds: 1) Price advertising adversely affected professionalism; 2) 
lawyer advertising was inherently misleading; 3) price advertising 
adversely affected the administration of justice; 4) expanded adver­
tising caused undesirable economic effects; 5) price advertising had 
an adverse effect on the quality of service provided by a lawyer; 
and 6) existing enforcement procedures were inadequate to super­
vise anything less than a total ban upon advertising. The Court 
balanced these justifications against the interest of the consumer 
and rehlted each one separately. 
The appellee bar association first asserted that the historical 
concept of professionalism required a ban on advertising. The 
Court, however, found the connection between advertising and the 
erosion of true professionalism to be "severely strained."65 Since 
the commercial nature of the relationship between the attorney and 
client is traditionally established when the fee is discussed during 
the initial interview, it would be inconsistent, in the Court's view, 
to ban the same information at an earlier time. 66 
The argument that all lawyer advertising was inherently mis­
leading did not persuade the majority. The Court decided that the 
consumer was able to understand the nature and extent of the legal 
service required. The Court, however, limited price advertising to 
routine, standardized services. This limitation minimizes consumer 
misunderstanding of the nahlre of the services advertised. A con­
sumer, in the Court's opinion, also has sufficient knowledge to 
evaluate advertising claims in relation to his particular problem. 
Even though the detail involved in performing the task may be 
unknown to the consumer, the Court stated that "he no doubt is 
able to identify the service he desires at the level of generality to 
which advertising lends itself. "67 The concern that consumers 
64. "An important objective of a state's regulatory scheme should be to encour­
age the education of laymen to recognize their legal problems, to facilitate the intel­
ligent selection of counsel, and to assist in making legal services fully available." 
Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae at 8, Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 
(1977). 
65. 433 U.S. at 368. 
66. [d. at 369. 
67. The lack of any distinction between routine and unique services troubled 
Justice Powell. In dissent, he stated, "Even the briefest reflection on the tasks for 
which lawyers are trained and the variation among the services they perform should 
caution against facile assumptions that legal services can be classified into the 
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would fail to consider the lawyer's skill when selecting legal coun­
sel was dismissed by the Court, since the alternative, prohibiting 
advertising and leaving the public ignorant, was of "dubious" 
value. 68 The Court concluded that price advertising would not ad­
versely affect the administration of justice or the quality of legal 
services. Since advertising was viewed by the Court as "the tra­
ditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier to in­
form a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of ex­
change,"69 the lifting of the advertising ban reduced a significant 
restriction on access to legal services. 7o The opinion further stated 
that restraints on advertising were "an ineffective way of deterring 
shoddy work. An attorney who is inclined to cut quality will do so 
regardless of the rule on advertising."71 
The Court did not find that expanded advertising would cause 
undesirable economic effects. Even though the effect of price ad­
vertising on the cost of legal services was uncertain,72 the Court 
decided that an increase in the cost of legal services was unlikely, 
particularly considering the appellants' goal ofreducing costs in this 
instance. 73 Also, the Court did not consider the cost of advertising 
a barrier to lawyers entering the profession. 74 Rather than inhibit­
ing the growth of an aspiring law practice, advertising, by inform­
ing potential clients of the existence of a new practice, could assist 
a lawyer in building a clientele. 75 
routine and the unique." Id. at 392. But cf. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Pro­
fessional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 714 (1977) (lawyers perform count­
less relatively standardized services which. vary in complexity but each job not ut­
terly' unique). See also notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. 
68. The majority noted that, despite the problem that the consumer may not 
consider the skill of the practitioner, 
the alternative-the prohibition of advertising-serves only to restrict the in­
formation that flows to consumers. Moreover, the argument assumes that the 
public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, 
and that the public is better kept in ignorance than entrusted with correct 
but incomplete information. 
433 U.S. at 374-75. 
69. Id. at 376. 
70. "The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to burden access to legal 
services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and unknowledgeable." Id. at 377. 
71. Id. at 378. 
72. The Court, however, noted that "where consumers have the benefit of price 
advertising, retail prices are often dramatically lower than they would be without 
advertising." Id. at 377 (citing Benhan, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of 
Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 337 (1972)). 
73. 433 U.S. at 377 & n.35. 
74. "Consideration of entry-barrier problems would urge that advertising be al­
lowed so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market." Id. at 378. 
75. "Advertising will have its greatest impact in expanding the information 
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The enforcement problem raised by the appellees did not sway 
the Court. The Court believed that most lawyers would continue to 
conduct their legal activities in conformity with ethical and profes­
sional guidelines. 76 Despite the possibility of deceptive and mis­
leading advertising, the existing ban, according to the Court, did 
not serve the best interests of the consumer. 77 
Since the Court was not persuaded that "any of the proffered 
justifications rises to the level of an acceptable reason for the sup­
pression of all advertising by attorneys, "78 the opinion next dis­
cussed whether, in the context of professional advertising, the 
overbreadth doctrine should be applied. The Court declined to 
apply the doctrine because this case was considered "a context 
where it is not necessary to further its intended objective. "79 
IV. THE LEGAL IMPACT OF BATES 
As a result of Bates, standards of professional conduct for 
lawyers have been revised. A six member task force on lawyer ad­
vertising, commissioned by the ABA during the consideration of 
Bates, submitted two proposals to the Board of Governors at the 
August 1977 meeting. 80 The proposal that was adopted and rec­
ommended to the states retains a structure similar to that of the 
present disciplinary rules. 81 The new rule provides that lawyers 
available to small clients and in ending the monopoly currently enjoyed by their 
lawyers." Morgan, supra note 67, at 741. 
76. The ABA explained the problem in this manner: 
The lawyer who advertises his willingness to perform a particular function 
for a specified amount must have a preconception of the package of services 
which he expects to perform. Rather than turn away a prospective client who 
is unaware that the offered package is inappropriate for his special needs 
and rather than perform the needed services, the lawyer may provide the 
standard package, even if it is not a direct fit. 
Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 17. 
77. 433 U.S. at 375. 
78. ld. at 379. 
79. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see notes 55-58 supra and 
accompanying text. Commercial speech usually survives the chilling effect of overly 
broad regulations. The Court looked instead to whether "appellants' advertisement 
[was] outside the scope of basic First Amendment protection." 433 U.S. at 381. 
80. Report to the Board of Governors of the Task Force on Lawyers Advertis­
ing, 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) 
has been amended to read: 
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection Qf a lawyer by poten­
tial consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast ... the 
following information in print media distributed or over radio broadcasted in 
the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices 
or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that 
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may advertise contingency fees, the range of fees charged for cer­
tain services, the hourly rate charged to a client, and charges for 
"specific legal services ... the description of which would not be 
misunderstood or be deceptive. . . . "82 Advertisements may be 
placed in newspapers and magazines. 83 Advertising by radio is 
permitted, but unless a state decides that television advertising is 
necessary to provide adequate information to consumers, television 
advertising is prohibited. 84 
If the advertisement quotes a fee, the revised rule requires a 
statement that the fee actually charged may depend upon the par­
ticular matter handled by the lawyer and that an estimate of the 
fee to be charged will be provided to the consumer without obliga­
tion. 85 Although this statement qualifYing the quoted fee is not re­
quired by the Court, the language appears to be a reasonable at­
tempt to prevent deception. If, however, the service performed by 
the lawyer is identical to the one defined in the advertisement, it 
would be improper for the lawyer to charge a fee in excess of the 
quoted fee. 86 
The 1977 amendment to the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE­
SPONSIBILITY attempts to balance the right of the lawyer with the 
the information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast 
complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a dignified manner. ... 
82. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101 
(B)(25) (1977 amendments). 
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) 
(1977 amendments). 
84. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) 
(1977 amendments), Ethical Consideration 2-2. Television has been included in 
Tennessee due to a recent decision by the state supreme court. The court felt that 
television was mandatory due to the large number of illiterate and semi-illiterate 
people. In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 
638 (Tenn. 1978). 
For an example of creative use of unconventional advertising media by an attor­
ney, see Lawyer Hur Rides Ad Chariot Built by U.S. Supreme Court, Springfield 
Daily News, Aug. 2, 1978, at 6, col. 1. Among other techniques, Attorney Ken Hur 
has his daughter-in-law wear a neck brace as she rides around Madison, Wisconsin in 
a truck bearing the message "Sideswiped? Call Ken Hur." 
85. For example, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary 
Rule 2-101(B)(23) (1977 amendment) states: 
Range of fees for services [may be advertised]; provided that the 
statement discloses that the specified fee within the range which will be 
charged will vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for 
each client and the client is entitled without obligation an estimate of the 
fee within the range likely to be charged .... 
86. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(E) 
states: "If a lawyer advertises a fee for a service, the lawyer must render that service 
for no more than the fee advertised." 
363 1978] LAWYER ADVERTISING 
protection of the uninformed consumer. It adequately protects the 
lawyer's right to present his advertising message to the consumer 
of legal services and the consumer's right to receive information 
about the cost and availability of legal services. Until the public 
becomes better informed about the nature of legal services, the 
cautionary language may be necessary to avoid misleading con­
sumers.87 
Following Bates, the type of message which may be presented 
in an advertisement will be determined by the consumer's need for 
reliable information to provide assistance in choosing legal repre­
sentation. The "routine services" which may be advertised by price 
include the services listed in Bates and any other service which 
may be concretely defined within an advertisement. The overriding 
concern is the avoidance of deception. 
To prevent consumer deception, certain types of advertising 
should be prohibited. Testimonial advertising, for instance, in­
volves a wide variety of subjective factors as to whether an attorney 
has successntlly served his client. A potentially biased opinion pre­
sented in this manner would have little, if any, value to the con­
sumer. Similarly, statistical data concerning a lawyer's won-lost rec­
ord or a quotation of a large tort recovery should be restricted. 88 
Whether a case has actually been won or lost may be ambiguous, 
and a prior success may influence the consumer into a false belief 
that the lawyer will successfully litigate his case. This informa­
tion would have little bearing upon the relative effectiveness of a 
lawyer. 
The Court declined to consider the issue of whether state­
ments relating to the quality of services offered by a lawyer may be 
advertised. 89 This area is likely to cause disagreement among 
members of the profession because of the difficulty in determining 
which statements are false, deceptive, or misleading, and therefore 
prohibited. 
87. The second proposal presented by the task force, "Proposal B," adopted a 
general anti-fraud standard instead of listing the specified items permitted to be 
advertised. Under "Proposal B" language, a lawyer would be prohibited from par­
ticipating in the use of any form of communication containing a false, fraudulent, 
misleading, or deceptive statement. Each of these prohibited elements are specifi­
cally defined within the rules. This proposal may be adopted by the states if they 
desire. See 46 U.S.L.W. 10 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
88. In response to a question by Justice Stevens concerning whether an attor­
ney could advertise his won-lost record or that he won his last nine cases, lost only 
three, and achieved a $100,000 settlement, the appellant's counsel replied in the af­
firmative. 45 U.S.L.W. 3497 (Jan. 25, 1977). 
89. 433 U.S. at 383-84. 
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Although the Bates decision avoids using the broader term of 
"professional advertising" throughout the opinion, advertising re­
strictions on other professionals, particularly the medical profes­
sion, will likely be rejected. The American Medical Association, in 
their amicus brief in favor of advertising restrictions, stated that 
"[ t]he Court's interpretation of the relationship between the pub­
lie's right to know and traditional restrictions on professional con­
duct will of necessity affect the ability of medical associations and 
state regulatory agencies to regulate certain conduct of physi­
cians."9o 
A trend towards allowing the consumer to receive price infor­
mation of medical services is indicated by the district court opinion 
in Health Systents Agency of Northern Virginia v. Virginia State 
Board of Medicine. 91 In that case, the agency sought information 
from physicians in the locality concerning their standard fees for 
particular services and billing practices. This information was avail­
able from the physician upon request by individual patients. The 
district court addressed the issue of whether the agency had a con­
stitutional right to gather, receive, and publish this information 
from physicians for a local directory. The right of the agency to 
proceed with its directory was upheld. 92 The court noted that the 
alternative of haVing patients obtain this information individually 
was inadequate, and that the directory, by containing a statement 
that the quoted fee may vary depending upon certain factors, ade­
quately protected the consumer from being misled. 93 
v. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON BATES 
Despite the far-reaching legal implications of Bates, change in 
the actual delivery of legal services has been minimal or nonexis­
tent. In the years preceding Bates, advocates on both sides of the 
90. Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae at 2, Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The AMA further asserts that "[i]n view of 
the vulnerability of consumers and the potentially tragic consequences of deception 
in this area, it is not unreasonable for a state to conclude that the public interest is 
best served by a clear, enforceable test proscribing certain easily-identifiable classes 
of professional advertising." [d. at 4. 
91. 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1976). 
92. The agency's proposal reasonably protects the public from being misled 
by the directory .... Since the advertising ban extends to the publication of 
truthful information, it may be justified only if the state has a valid interest in 
protecting the public from the danger that some people will unwittingly use 
the information to their detriment. 
[d. at 274-75. 
93. [d. at 276. 
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lawyer advertising issue debated the practical effects of lifting the 
ban. Those opposed to lifting the ban cited deceptive advertise­
ments, potential dominance by large firms able to afford large 
quantities of advertising, and a bewildering variety of advertise­
ments as factors favoring the ban. Proponents of lawyer advertising, 
on the other hand, pointed to such practical benefits as increased 
specialization, price competition, more informed consumers, and a 
proliferation of legal clinics to support lifting the ban. 
None of these changes have materialized to any significant ex­
tent in the year following Bates. One reason for the absence of 
significant change within the profession is that many state bar as­
sociations are still in the process of amending their rules. Because 
of the lack of guidelines during the amending process, many poten­
tial advertisers are awaiting final action by their respective bar as­
sociations. 
The rules, however, have been modified in enough states to 
permit a limited projection of the ultimate effects of lifting the ad­
vertising ban. The advertising of routine legal services will have 
little or no long-term effect on the profession. An examination of 
the practical limitations of advertising routine services dem­
onstrates that this type of advertising is ill-suited to the traditional 
practice of law. For purposes of this examination, the large firm, 
the small practice, and the legal clinic provide three convenient 
subdivisions of the legal profession. 94 
Lawyer advertising affects large firms95 least of all. In part, 
this is because the complex legal problems that are the mainstay of 
a large firm's business are nearly always unique. For that reason, it 
would be most unusual for billing to be on a transactional basis. 
While an hourly rate could be advertised, the uncertainty of the 
94. These arbitrary subdivisions serve expediency more than they serve accu­
racy. The following comments do not attempt to pigeonhole the practice of law into 
three compartments. No doubt, some of the observations that follow are invalid in 
many specific instances. Nonetheless, this general overview allows at least limited 
discussion of the lawyer advertising problem on a practical level. For a cautionary 
note regarding the term "routine services," see Justice Powell's dissent, 433 U.S. at 
389-96. 
95. Although the terms "large" and "small" ostensibly refer to the size of a 
firm, it is the type of practice, rather than sheer size, that is the crucial factor in this 
context. "Large firm" includes practices that handle mostly corporate accounts on a 
retainer basis. In large cities, firms that typically handle corporate business may con­
sist of 200 or more attorneys. In small to medium cities, corporate business may be 
handled by firms with 10 to 20 attorneys. Often, even the largest firm in a small to 
medium city may also perform routine services. Thus, the "large firm" generalities 
discussed in this comment apply to these firms to the extent that they handle corpo­
rate work. 
/ 
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amount of work to be done would render the advertisement all but 
useless for purposes of estimating the final charge. It seems un­
likely, therefore, that advertising could provide meaningful price 
information to clients. 
A second and more fundamental reason exists for large firms to 
forego ordinary advertising. While the typical corporate client may 
be influenced by an advertisement strategically placed in a business 
journal, that client is much more likely to base its choice of counsel 
on traditional considerations. The type of advertising now permit­
ted by Bates may be unnecessary for the large firm that has tradi­
tionally employed an entirely legal form of "solicitation." This ref­
erence, of course, is to the exposure and good will generated by 
membership at social and athletic clubs, or on corporate boards of 
directors. Furthermore, the large number of attorneys who leave 
such firms "advertise" the firms and presumably refer business 
back to them. For these two reasons-the nature of its services and 
the efficacy of the traditional forms of solicitation-large firms are 
unlikely to take advantage of the new rules allowing advertising. 96 
At first glance, small practices would appear to be in a better 
position to take advantage of the new advertising rules. Unlike a 
large firm, a small practice often provides routine services such as 
divorce, adoption, wills, real estate closings, and incorporation of 
small businesses. These services, in their simplest form, are readily 
described in an ordinary advertisement. Standardized prices, or at 
least a meaningful minimum fee, can be determined for these ser­
vices. In addition to the type of service offered, the type of client 
attracted by a small practice can be a factor in the decision to ad­
vertise. Small practices typically depend on either individual or 
small corporate clients for much of their business. These clients are 
more likely to be swayed by conventional advertising than the large 
institutional client. 
Despite this greater potential for the use of advertising, small 
practices will be inhibited from advertising by peer pressure and 
uncertain client reaction. Within the legal profession, there is a 
subtle, yet strong, feeling that the advertising attorney has some­
how broken ranks with her more conventional brothers and sisters 
of the bar. The fear of being perceived as a maverick by other 
attorneys and judges may prevent many otherwise undecided 
96. Many large firms refrain from ordinary advertising for still a third reason: 
appearing to be in need of additional work does not comport with the "blue chip" 
image. 
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lawyers from advertising. In addition to peer pressure, unknown 
client reaction may dissuade many small practitioners from advertis­
ing. Some potential clients may react negatively toward lawyer ad­
vertising. The small practitioner must decide, then, whether the 
positive client reactions will outweigh the negative in terms of fee 
generation. Given the present attitudes which prevail among 
lawyers and the public, most small practices will choose not to ad­
vertise because it is simply too risky. 
Unlike the large firm or small practice, the nature of legal 
clinics not only favors, but requires advertising. 97 Again, the type 
of service and type of client dictate the result. By definition, legal 
clinics concentrate on routine services for consumers.98 Because 
these services are easily described to consumers, advertising 
minimum fees for routine services is effective for legal clinics. 
Moreover, legal clinics need high volume to realize the economies 
of scale upon which lower fees are predicated. 99 Thus, advertising 
is not only an effective means of solicitation for clinics; it is indis­
pensable. For the clinical practitioner, peer pressure is not a sig­
nificant consideration; anyone who opens a legal clinic has accepted 
the consequences of being perceived as a maverick by the rest of 
the profession. 
Advertising routine services is realistically feasible only for the 
clinic. Because of the type of services offered and the type of 
clients served, as well as other pressures, the large firm and small 
practice will refrain from advertising routine legal services. With 
advertising thus restricted, and the growth of legal clinics currently 
confined to urban areas, many of the predicted benefits of lawyer 
advertising may not flow to the consumer as a result of Bates. To 
be sure, if a consumer lives in a city served by a clinic, and has a 
routine problem, he now has the advantage of learning the fee 
schedules of various lawyers. 
This advantage, however, is currently of little consequence. 
The bold consumer could shop around before Bates. Mere knowl­
edge of a fee schedule for routine services does not appreciably 
inform the consumer about the nature of legal services, nor does it 
significantly improve access to legal services. The routine nature of 
advertised services dictates that the consumer is already aware of 
97. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See Meyers, Legal Clinics: Their Theory And How They Work, 52 L.A. B.J. 
106 (1976). 
99. [d. 
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their existence. Furthermore, the demand for these services, di­
vorce for example, is relatively inelastic. The advertising of routine 
services does not inform the consumer as to when she might have a 
legal problem, how it could have been prevented, or what legal 
remedies are available. In the wake of Bates, consumers still need 
information about what kinds of legal services are available and 
how they can have access to those services. 
Publishing the cost of an initial consultation would serve these 
educational and accessibility functions. By advertising the cost of an 
initial consultation, lawyers would encourage consumers to seek 
legal advice earlier. Often, consumers are unsure if they actually 
have a legal problem. Even if a legal difficulty is apparent, con­
sumers often postpone seeking a lawyer's advice until their legal 
situation badly deteriorates. This critical delay results largely from 
anxiety over possible attorney's fees. "Fee fear" could be allayed by 
the initial consultation, where the individual's problem could be 
explored, and fees could be estimated. By helping consumers iden­
tifY legal problems and seek help in solving them in their early 
stages, advertising the initial consultation fee would clearly im­
prove the delivery of legal services. 100 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conclusions to be drawn from Bates apply to legal adver­
tising in particular and advertising by professionals in general. It is 
evident that a total ban upon truthful advertising will not withstand 
100. Even though knowledge of initial consultation fees would greatly aid the 
consumer, this advertising is unnecessary for large firms. Sophisticated clients of 
large firms need no prodding to seek the advice of counsel. Consequently, the initial 
consultation is not critical for attracting clients to a large firm. 
The small practice, on the other hand, has much to gain by advertising its initial 
consultation fee. The small practice often caters to small, but growing businesses 
with a variety of problems, moderate estates, clients with moderate real estate trans­
actions, and people with family law problems. Potential clients in these categories 
often verge on recognizing a present or future legal problem. Sometimes they seek 
legal help, sometimes not. Persons teetering on a decision to seek help are natural 
targets for advertising. Information regarding the initial consultation will very likely 
push the consumer toward the attorney's office because such advertising will erase 
the two largest mental blocks currently keeping her away. First, she can find out if 
she actually has a legal problem for a relatively small fee. Second, if there is a need 
for legal services, the consumer can get at least a rough estimate of the fees that will 
be involved. This soothes the client's anxieties regarding legal fees in general. Thus, 
advertising initial consultation fees can benefit both the consumer and the small 
practice. The benefits to the small practice may well outweigh advertising's negative 
aspects. Specifically, the potential fee generation may make the risks and pressures 
worth enduring for the small practice. 
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a first amendment challenge. The recognition of the consumer's 
right to receive information in the form of a commercial advertise­
ment will prevail against justifications asserted by proponents of a 
total ban. 
The Court will not employ overbreadth analysis to reject a 
challenged restriction without first considering the particular 
speech in question. The Court will scrutinize each professional ad­
vertisement sought to be restricted and decide if it is deserving of 
constitutional protection. Commercial speech will be protected 
provided that it is not false, deceptive, or misleading. 
The consumer has become the focal point in cases involving 
professional advertising and advertising in general. The consumer's 
right to receive commercial information is considered to be as great 
as, if not greater than, the right of a professional to advertise. Pro­
fessional associations have an obligation to educate the consumer 
and increase their understanding of the nature of the advertised 
service in order to prevent the consumer from being unintention­
ally misled. 
Within the legal profession, the ability to present information 
about the cost and availability of legal services will foster the 
growth of alternative forms of practice. In addition to the legal 
clinic, other forms of law practice, such as the prepaid legal plans 
promoted by bar associations, will also be able to inform the public 
about the existence and availability of the program in the local 
newspaper. An informed public will presumably indicate its desire 
for innovative forms of legal practice by positively responding to ad­
vertisements. 
While Bates expanded lawyers' first amendment rights by lift­
ing the total ban on advertising, the limited experience since the 
decision indicates that obstacles in addition to disciplinary rules are 
stifling lawyer advertising. The complex and unique nature of most 
legal services, combined with deeply rooted traditional attitudes 
within the profession, remain as barriers to large scale lawyer ad­
vertising. 
Kenneth Bennett 
